Introduction
The purpose of copyright is to encourage the creation and mass dissemination of a wide variety of works. Until recently, most means of mass dissemination required a significant capital investment. Disseminators needed printing presses, trains or trucks, warehouses, broadcast towers, or communications satellites. It made economic sense to channel the lion's share of the proceeds of copyrights to the publishers and distributors, and the law was designed to facilitate that.
1 Digital distribution raises the possibility of mass dissemination without the assistance of professional distributors, via direct author-to-consumer and consumer-toconsumer dissemination. Digital distribution, thus, invites us to reconsider the assumptions underlying the conventional copyright model.
We are still in the early history of the networked digital environment, but already we've seen experiments with both direct and consumer-toconsumer distribution of works of authorship. Direct author distributionby itself -has not yet garnered a lot of attention because the most publicized efforts have been less than wholly successful.
2 When direct author distribution is augmented by consumer-to-consumer distribution, though, the combination has the potential to revolutionize the distribution chain. That potential has not escaped the attention of professional distributors. Consumer-to-consumer dissemination, especially in the form of peer-to-peer file sharing, has been met with hostility and panic. F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the monopoly privileges conferred by copyright protection and the potential financial rewards therefrom are not directly serving to motivate authors to write individual articles; rather, they serve to motivate publishers to produce journals, which provide the conventional and often exclusive means for disseminating these individual articles").
2. Stephen King's The Plant has been the most famous example of the direct distribution model. Stephen King promised to keep writing the novel so long as three quarters of the individuals who downloaded each chapter paid a dollar for it. Initially, 76% of the people who downloaded chapters paid. After 4 chapters, the percentage of paying readers dropped to 46%, and King dropped the project. See M.J. Rose, Stephen King's "Plant" Uprooted, WIREDNEWS, Nov. 28, 2000, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,40356,00.html. While 46% probably exceeds the percentage of paying readers of a typical work of King fiction published in book form (allowing for book borrowers, used book purchasers, etc.), it fell below King's announced minimum.
3 Legislation pending in Congress seeks to deter consumers from engaging in peer-to-peer file sharing. 4 Meanwhile, representatives of the music, recording and film industries have sued the purveyors of peer-to-peer file sharing software, 5 the Internet service providers who enable consumers to trade files, 6 and more than 5000 individual consumers accused of making recorded music available to other consumers over the Internet. 7 In this paper, I propose that we look for some of the answers to the vexing problem of unauthorized exchange of music files on the Internet in the wisdom intellectual property law has accumulated about the protection and distribution of factual information. In particular, I analyze the digital information resource that has developed on the Internet, and suggest that what we should be trying to achieve is an online musical smorgasbord of comparable breadth and variety.
Ten years ago, an influential government task force proposed enhancing the scope of intellectual property rights in the digital environment as a device to encourage investment in the infrastructure underlying a national digital network. 8 As the task force explained, the cost of constructing such a network was beyond the federal government's ability to fund, and the construction would need to be undertaken by the private sector. The private sector, however, would be reluctant to invest its resources unless it saw profits to be made. The network would be commercial only if large numbers of people could be persuaded to subscribe to digital network services, which would require a killer application to draw people online. In the view of the task force, that application was the possibility consumers could enjoy movies, music and other content on demand. Enhanced copyright protection would be needed to persuade the producers of movies, music and other content to make the investment in making their material available over the national digital network. In order to create a viable online information and entertainment resource, the task force concluded, the United States needed to promise the distributors of copyrighted works a larger share of the copyright pie -only then would they invest the resources needed to develop digital content that would be sufficiently compelling to convince ordinary consumers to pay for Internet access. 9 With the benefit of hindsight, it's become clear that most of the assumptions underlying that argument were wrong. Greatly expanded copyright has not yet encouraged movies or music online -there is an enormous variety of music and movies available over the Internet, but the overwhelming majority of what's there is there over the vehement objections of the content owners. Nonetheless, the network has grown at an unbelievable rate. The killer application that fueled the growth of the Internet wasn't digital movies, after all. Instead, it was communicationemail, chat, online forums and personal web pages. It turns out that people want to communicate with one another, and that they love to share. The information space that has grown up on the World Wide Web is largely the result of anarchic volunteerism -not to build the pipes, which have been constructed by telephone and cable companies to meet consumer demand for broadband Internet access, 10 but to supply the information that runs through them. Anecdotal evidence indicates that at least for some material, untamed digital sharing turns out to be a more efficient method of distribution than either paid subscription or the sale of conventional copies. If untamed anarchic digital sharing is a superior distribution mechanism, or even a useful adjunct to conventional distribution, we ought to encourage it rather than make it more difficult.
Part I of this essay explores the burgeoning digital information space that has grown up on the Internet in the last two decades. In Part II, I review the legal obstacles preventing us from simply treating digital music the way we treat digital information. Amendments to the copyright law enacted over the past 30 years have erected legal barriers to consumer-toconsumer distribution that make lawful exchange of copyrighted material extremely difficult. Part III tells a true story about my son's third grade classroom, and spends a brief moment looking at his teacher's use of the resources she finds on the Internet. Part IV suggests that we look to the digital information space described in Part I as a model for crafting a solution to the controversy over peer-to-peer file sharing, and reviews some of the proposals made in recent copyright scholarship. Finally, Part V 9. Id.; LITMAN, supra note 1, at 89-100. briefly outlines a particular solution that is in some respects different from those discussed earlier.
I. Someone knows what I want to know
Someone knows what I want to know. Someone has the information I want. If I can find her, I can learn it from her. She will share it with me.
Which came first, the computer or network television?
11 I could try to find the answer in a reference book instead. On my bookshelf, I have two editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica, one published in 1989 and one assembled at a public library used-book sale from individual volumes published in 1964 and 1966. I no longer consult either of them with any frequency. In a jewel case somewhere near my desk, I have a multimedia CD ROM version of the Britannica that I received as a gift in 1998. I never look at it at all, and haven't since the month that I received it. I used to buy an Almanac each year to look up quick facts (what's the population of New Zealand? 12 How old is Senator Barbara Mikulski? 13 ), but between 1994 and beginning work on this project, I didn't bother. I stopped relying on these books as it became possible to find specific answers to particular questions online, because the person or persons who knew what I wanted to know had been generous enough to post the answer where it was easy for me to find it. The search was quicker, and commonly yielded more accurate information, than consulting whatever reference books were handy.
Although the Internet's usefulness as an engine of commerce has flowed and ebbed, its value as a repository of information has continued to grow exponentially. What we used to class as trivia (and therefore useless information) becomes a matchless resource when it is combined with other trivia in searchable form.
14 Volunteers, most of them amateurs, have collected an unimaginable variety of information and are eager to share it with the world. What I want to know may not be in any book on my shelf or in my university's libraries. I can probably find it on the Internet in less than an hour.
What are sesame seeds? 15 Networked digital technology has transformed information and the way that we interact with it. Digital information is extraordinarily accessible. If I have a question, I don't need to make up an answer that seems plausible, or reason out what it's likely to be. I don't need to go to the library and ask the reference librarian if I can see the library's only copy of a reference book that ought to have the answer. I can just turn to my computer and look it up on the web. 16 Digital information, moreover, is shared. Ten, even five, years ago, it was conventional to talk about the Internet as a tool for disintermediation. Authors and musicians would be able to use digital networks to send stuff directly to their readers and listeners. (Remember Stephen King's The Plant?
17 ) There's some of that. People post content on their websites for the rest of the world to view. Academics exchange drafts of scholarly papers that way, 18 and independent musicians and composers make 19 But, while we've seen a small but appreciable amount of direct distribution, there's even more consumer-to-consumer distribution. The "blog" (or weblog) is an increasingly popular art form in which people post ongoing, public, hyperlinked diaries of things they find interesting and want to share.
20
Readers of the blogs write in to contribute their own comments.
21
Someone has the recording I want. If I can find her, she'll share it with me. I can copy it and pass it on. Someone knows the answer to my question. If I can locate her, she'll tell me. I can learn it and pass it on. Someone has seen the source I want to consult. She can tell me where to find it. The most powerful engine driving this information space turns out not to be money -at least if we're focusing on generating and disseminating the content rather than constructing the hardware that it moves through. What seems to be driving the explosive growth in this information space is that people like to look things up, and they want to share. This information economy is largely a gift economy. The overwhelming majority of the information I'm talking about is initially posted by volunteers. Many of them are amateurs, motivated by enthusiasm for their topics, a desire to pass interesting stuffon, and, perhaps, an interest in attention and the benefits it may bring. When one is a volunteer, the time and effort one is willing to put into contributing to the information space can seem limitless. Volunteers move on, of course: they get bored, or broke, or caught up in other things, but there seems to be an inexhaustible supply of new volunteers to take their places, and, luckily, the new volunteers are able to build on earlier volunteers' foundations.
23 I potentially know all of the information the other participants know. Their knowledge can be my knowledge with a few clicks of a mouse. In return, I make my knowledge 22 . I quote verbatim the text of two email messages: Has anyone seen a copy of the complaint in Hamilton v. Microsoft, the class action suit filed in California recently seeking to hold Microsoft liable for the vulnerability of its software? available to anyone who happens by. Each of us can draw on the information stores of the others. 24 The rate at which people have adopted the Internet as their research tool of choice is astonishing. People find the easy availability of all that information empowering. People want to know how old Steven Spielberg is. They want to know the history of early radio. They want to know what traveling musicians wore in 15 th Century Europe. They want to know how to make Shaker Lemon Pie. They want to know what the Constitution actually says. If it's quick and easy to do so, they'll look it up. They enjoy discovering new stuff. The system has been evolving as we watch: consumer-to-consumer interaction is leading to more information, better information, and more accessible information; more complete and deeper archives; wider ranges of divergent sources. 25 People appreciate the instant gratification of learning answers in a moment. Probably more important than the speed of the system, however, is its breadth and depth. Because of the disparate contributions of a host of volunteers, one can find information that would not appear in conventional reference sources.
26
Ten years ago, not only Washington, but the entire journalism business believed that the burgeoning digital network (which went by the name, back then, of the "National Information Infrastructure") would 24 . If you read a lot of science fiction, this model should feel familiar. A number of authors have portrayed worlds in which characters are connected to a massive electronic database, which they can query at will. See, e.g., FRANK HERBERT, DUNE (1965); JOAN VINGE, THE SNOW QUEEN (1980). This is different. The World Wide Web is certainly not a database in the conventional sense. The information has neither structure nor organization. It has no index, no table of contents, and no hierarchy. The domain name system supplies a hierarchy of location, but information is not organized in any analogous fashion. Instead, the Internet gives me access to a fluid conglomeration of the items millions of individuals have chosen to make publicly available. A variety of third party search engines purport to index only a small portion of the web. develop into a 500 channel interactive television system, with "interactive" meaning that it would incorporate a method for ordering and charging purchases and receiving targeted advertising.
27
There are a number of businesses out there that are continuing to try to shove the Internet in that direction, 28 but it isn't yet anything like a 500 channel TV largely because of the way people have come to interact with information.
What is "the fuct of Pepsiman"? 29 Let's pause for a word from our friendly reference book publishers. Speed and convenience are all very well, but doesn't selecting the speediest research tool ignore the quality and reliability of the information I retrieve? The Internet, after all, is an infamous source of falsehood and untruth.
30
Books and periodicals have editors and fact checkers to screen out misinformation; websites need not.
31
The story, as stories often do, turns out to be more complicated. The efforts of editors and fact checkers have apparently not, for example, prevented periodicals from reprinting Internet untruths as if they were fact.
32 That should not be surprising. Many editors and fact checkers are neither well paid nor well qualified to assure the accuracy of the information their employers print. Not all publications use them. Often, fact checkers must rely on authors to direct them to corroborating sources. The customs of different disciplines may control how carefully content is checked. 33 Correcting errors in print publications is difficult and expensive. Except in cases egregious enough to merit a recall, 34 the corrections must be put off until the publication of a later edition.
On the World Wide Web, in contrast, correcting errors and revising documents is simple and inexpensive. One can rewrite a file several times each day and spend nothing more than the time that it takes to enter the revisions and transmit the file to the server. If one makes a mistake, there are dozens of eager volunteers likely to send one an email offering corrections. 35 Indeed, the feedback of knowledgeable readers is a powerful force promoting accuracy on the web. With the world looking in, errors are much more likely to be identified, 36 and correcting them is easy. Stepping back to look at the whole dynamic information space, it becomes clear that the remote participation of readers doesn't stop at writing comments in other people's blogs, or even at writing in to correct errors or misstatements. Fellow enthusiasts are likely to reuse the information they find in one web page -or a dozen-in their own web pages. A reader may simply post a hyperlink to someone else's page, or she may appropriate some prose, combine it with her own prose and additional prose lifted from some other sites, and post the amalgam as her own (with or without attribution). Thus does information spread. What makes this economy so astonishingly useful is information sharing -we're not each downloading facts from some giant Encyclopedia Britannica in the sky. We are both finding what we need and making available material that we've generated or assembled.
33. Law is a particularly curious example. The editors of most law journals are students, and the closest we get to fact checking is cite-checking, where students will confirm that sources support the assertions for which they are cited. In practice, anything can be corroborated merely by identifying some document that asserts it.
34. Florence Fabricant, Magazine Corrects a Cookie Recipe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991 at C4 (Gourmet magazine published a recipe calling for "oil of wintergreen" as an ingredient. Upon discovering that oil of wintergreen is toxic, the magazine sent out a warning letter to its 800,000 subscribers. 
II. Formalities and Default Rules
Who wrote "When I was One-and-Twenty"?
44
The purpose of copyright is to promote the progress of science, by encouraging the production and dissemination of works of authorship. 45 The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doral, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)) (footnotes omitted). A discussion of the economic rationale for copyright in the earlier case of Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1952), described the basis for copyright in terms of reward and desert:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered. The rationale has evolved into a justification for any expansion in the scope of copyright protection: stronger copyrights mean more powerful incentives mean that more works of authorship will be created and distributed to a larger slice of the public. Opponents of copyright expansion have tried to argue against enhancements within the confines of the incentive model, with little success. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002).
contributions of this networked digital information space to the "Progress of Science" are difficult to overestimate. Already, a network of people sharing what they know has made many of the most popular reference sources obsolete. Thus, one might reasonably expect that a law designed to promote the Progress of Science would encourage the robust growth and prodigious use of this network to exchange the full spectrum of interesting material.
Under current law, though, the information space I'm talking about is lawful only because so much of its content -the facts, information, and ideas -is in the public domain. 46 To the extent that the material in this information space is in the public domain, we can all share it, use it, and reuse it. To the extent it's protected by copyright, on the other hand, we would need permission to do all of that, and, as a practical matter, it would be impossible to secure that permission. One of the most salient lessons from the copyright wars of the last few years is that if express permission is required before one can post a collection of anything on the Internet, one will be unable to do it. 47 To appreciate the extent of the problem, it's helpful to review key changes in the copyright law and the information space over the past thirty years. Today, facts are some of the only material solidly part of the public domain. Thirty years ago, the public domain was far more expansive. In 1974, federal copyright protection was not automatic. To get it, you needed to distribute copies of your work to the public, and the copies needed to be marked with a copyright notice. 48 Notice of copyright -the familiar C-ina-circle, along with the name of the copyright owner and the date the work was first published -secured copyright. Distributing copies without notice caused the work to enter the public domain. 49 Indeed, while the copyright system offered authors protection for a limited time as an incentive to encourage them to distribute their works to the public, it also attempted to ensure that most works entered the public domain promptly, so that the public could make unfettered use of them. 50 Copyright law was designed to separate works whose authors wanted copyright protection enough to follow a few simple rules for preserving it, from works that would have been created and distributed anyway.
51
Thirty years ago, when you saw something you wanted to use or share, the default rule was that you were entitled to do so. Unless the object was marked "do not copy" you were, with some modest exceptions, entitled to assume it was in the public domain, because the absence of a copyright notice ensured that it was in the public domain (even if it hadn't been before).
52 Not only that, but the notice had to be accurate, had to tell you when the copyright was scheduled to expire, and had to tell you to whom you needed to address any request for permission. 53 The overwhelming majority of potentially copyrightable works didn't have this notice and entered the public domain the minute copies were publicly distributed. Of the ones that bore the prescribed copyright notice, only a fraction were registered, and of the fraction that were registered, only 15% were renewed, so for most of the copyright-protected works that had the requisite notice, copyright protection lasted only 28 years.
54
When was the U.S. army first officially racially segregated? When was it officially integrated?
55
The formalities get a bad rap these days. We've left that sort of thinking behind us; we're more enlightened now. We know better than to 50 The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, at http://www.gliah.uh.edu/historyonline/ integrating.cfm, reports that it was not until 1869 that Congress enacted a law requiring soldiers to fight in racially segregated units. In 1948, President Truman issued an executive order directing the armed forces to desegregate. Integration began slowly on a unit-by-unit basis, and in 1951, the Army Chief of Staff ordered all units to desegregate.
condition copyright protection on a bunch of technical requirements. 56 (We feel more comfortable conditioning use of copyrighted works on a bunch of even more technical requirements.
57 ) The formalities have been so thoroughly discredited that some of us have even stopped teaching them.
58
What we miss when we dismiss the formalities as characteristic of a provincial and outmoded attitude is that the formalities were the principal method embodied in U.S. copyright law for preserving the public domain and encouraging the public to use, reuse, and share potentially copyrightable material. If you read older copyright cases, textbooks and law review articles, you find a broad consensus that copyright law was designed to encourage the growth of the public domain.
59
The theory underlying the system was that a rich public domain was essential to the progress of knowledge. By offering copyright for a limited time to authors who distributed their works to the public, copyright bribed them to generate material for the public domain.
60
The old rules worked to preserve copyright for works whose owners wanted it enough to take the affirmative steps required to assert it. The law made copyright subject to exceedingly modest requirements to claim protection and put the public on notice. It was designed to force everything else into the public domain, so that everyone else could make whatever use of it they wanted. Copyright wasn't automatic, but it was easy to secure. Putting a notice on publicly distributed copies might not be trivial, but it is far easier than the effort involved in applying for a patent, or registering a trademark. Retaining copyright after the initial 28 year term was a little harder, but again, not very hard. Nothing one would need a lawyer for. Meanwhile, the rules were designed to make it easier for people who wanted to negotiate a license to use a work protected by copyright to know whether and whom they needed to ask. Again, for most licenses, a lawyer would be strictly optional.
Congress abandoned many of the formalities when it enacted the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, 61 and ditched the rest of them in 1989 when we acceded to the Berne Convention. 62 In 1976, we essentially abolished the rule that publication without notice or with inaccurate notice sent the work into the public domain, 63 and in 1989 we abolished the notice requirement entirely. 64 We also made other changes to the law that, cumulatively, reversed the default rule. Today, all potentially copyrightable works are protected by copyright, whether their authors want copyright protection or not. 66. Someone named Susan Green submitted the classic version of the recipe to AllRecipe's site at www.pierecipes.com, see http://www.pierecipes.com/az/ ShakerLemonPie.asp. The same recipe was submitted by someone named Pat Dennis to the Carnegie Mellon University recipe server. See http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~mjw/recipes/pie/sweet/shaker-lemon-pie.html. The Encyclopedia Britannica Online at http://www.britannica.com/ ("Search Results You Can Trust") includes entries for "lemon," "pie" and "Shaker," but nothing for "shaker lemon pie." copyright.
67
So far as I can tell, the change was completely uncontroversial. Divisibility is exceedingly useful. It's the biggest reason that authors don't need to sign over their copyrights when they publish things. It allows the author to keep control over different sorts of exploitation of her work by different entities. The problem with divisibility is that it potentially requires multiple licenses for any single use of a copyrighted work, while simultaneously making it very difficult to tell who owns the rights one needs to license. 68 There once was an interesting Internet start-up named MP3.com, which specialized in making both major-label and unsigned music available in the MP3 format. MP3.com intended to stream copyrighted music to its subscribers, and bought ASCAP and BMI public performance licenses to allow it to do so. That seems right. If you look at the statutory definition of public performance, it appears to cover Internet streaming quite nicely.
69
MP3.com got sued for willful infringement (and lost) because it didn't also license the reproduction rights to those songs, which are controlled by a different entity. 70 This is much worse in the Internet context because copyright owners have asserted, so far successfully, that every time a work is made available over the Internet, someone has reproduced the work, distributed the work, [T]here are too many vested industry players for downstream users to be able to efficiently obtain the authorizations needed for downstream use of recorded music. Second, the divisible yet overlapping rights granted to copyright owners lead to industry gridlock and problems with holdout behavior. Finally, the demands for payment from the downstream user by too many vested industry players, combined with industry consolidation, result in the price being too high to achieve the goal of copyright. Loren, supra, at 698. ; see also Schwartz, supra note 68 (MIT music streaming service suspended because of dispute over whether the licensors of the various elements of the service had the authority to sell MIT the licenses it purchased). and publicly performed or displayed the work. 71 Anyone who wants to post a work on the web, thus, needs a license from the owners of each of these rights, plus a license from the owners of each of these rights in any underlying works that are incorporated within the work. 72 Under the current leading analysis of how copyright law interacts with the Internet, making any material available over the Internet (whether via posting it on a website, sending it through email, posting it to Usenet news, typing it on Internet relay chat or making it available in a share directory associated with a peer-to-peer file trading application) constitutes a reproduction of the material, a distribution of the material to the public, and a public display or performance of the material. It is therefore illegal unless done with the authorization of the copyright owners of the reproduction right, the public distribution right, and the public display or public performance right, as well as the copyright owners of those rights in any underlying material.
73
It counts as an actionable copy notwithstanding the fact that the reproduction may be ephemeral (what the law used to deem unfixed).
74 It counts as a distribution to the public notwithstanding the fact that no tangible copy of the material is transferred (what the law used to deem a display or performance rather than a distribution). 75 It constitutes a public display or performance notwithstanding the fact that any display or performance may occur only between two individual computers (what the law used to deem private). Indeed, there's some indication in the case law that making a hyperlink to material available over the Internet may be deemed to be a reproduction, public distribution, and public performance or public display, requiring the permission of the owners of the reproduction, distribution and public performance and display rights in the material on the other end of the link. 77 Moreover, the theory underlying the recording industry's recent service of more than a thousand subpoenas 78 on Internet service providers and universities appears to be that merely possessing an unauthorized digital copy of a protected work, in circumstances in which a member of the public could download a copy of the work from the possessor's hard disk, may itself be infringing distribution. 79 And (as if that weren't troubling enough) largely because of the adoption of divisibility of copyright, in many if not most cases, it can be difficult and sometimes impossible to discover who the copyright owners of all of those rights are. 81 One of the more disturbing revelations of the Napster litigation was that record companies insisted that they were unable 79. The theory of liability appears to be based on the idea that the 106(3) distribution right in the U.S. copyright statute should be read expansively to encompass the equivalent of the European right, under article 3 of the EU Directive, to make a work available or communicate it to the public. See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 3 (2001). That makes little sense given the overall structure of the US copyright statute, which separates public performance and public display from distribution to the public, and specifies distinct privileges and exceptions for each of them. See 17 U.S.C. § § 109, 110, 111, 112, 118 (2000) 80. H.R. 2752, 108th Cong.. (2003) . The Bill would define "placing of a copyrighted work . . . on a computer network accessible to the public" as criminal copyright infringement unless the copyright owner had authorized it. A conventional home or WiFi network without firewall protection is accessible to the public in the sense the bill defines it.
81. See O'Brien, supra note 47, at 31.
to generate a list of the copyrighted works they claimed to own. 82 (This is particularly disquieting because one would assume they kept records in order to send out those royalty checks they're supposed to be sending out, but apparently not.) Some of the problem, apparently, is record keeping, but not most of it. In addition to difficulties caused by lost or misfiled records, there is significant legal uncertainty about the ownership of rights to control digital exploitation of works that are subject to contracts contemplating conventional exploitation. 83 Record companies, for example, have claimed to own all copyright rights in the recorded music they distribute under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, but most experts agree that those claims are unpersuasive. 84 A successful effort to amend the copyright law to strengthen the record labels' work-made-for-hire arguments excited so much outrage among musicians that the recording industry persuaded Congress to repeal the amendment the following year. 85 Without the benefit of a work-made-for-hire claim, though, the record labels' claims to own the digital rights to the recordings they produce requires a work-by-work, contract-by-contract analysis. New York Times v. Tasini 86 and Random House v. Rosetta Books 87 teach us that contractual assignments of copyright may not necessarily include the electronic rights. We'd have to examine the contracts to be sure. We might need to know whether the case would be coming up on the east coast or the west coast. 88 We'd also need to see the contract between the composer and the music publisher for each song on the recording, and the contracts between each of the music publishers and the record company that recorded each song. Those contracts aren't publicly available. One suspects that a large number of them are no longer in anyone's file cabinets either. Bottom line: we don't know with any certainty who owns the digital rights in any number of recorded musical performances. That may be why record companies have scrambled to settle cases when their ownership of sound recordings is actually put in issue. 89 If I want to share my music collection with my newfound friend who was able to tell me that the "Fuct of Pepsiman" is a promotional toy released in Japan by the Pepsi Cola Company, there isn't any way for me to figure out whose permission I need to ask.
Today, in short, everything is protected by copyright and it is almost impossible to figure out whom to ask for permission. Just as we built a communications network that would permit us, if we chose to, to dispense with a complicated and expensive distribution infrastructure, we ditched the legal rules that would have permitted us to do so.
90

III. Digression: The Music of Room A-9
What are the lyrics to "The Syncopated Clock?"
91
When my son was in the third grade, one of his assignments required him to conduct research on the flora, fauna, and climate of the alpine tundra. His teacher didn't send him to look it up in books -indeed, the school library didn't have a lot of information to offer on the alpine tundra. My son's teacher sent him to look it up on the Web. She gave him a list of URLs for some websites that were likely to lead him to the information he needed, and sat him down in front of a computer to do his research. At the end of the school year, this teacher said goodbye to the class and presented all of the students with a souvenir: A home-burned CD full of Room A-9's favorite songs. Where did the songs come from? My son's elementary school teacher had downloaded them from the Internet herself so the class could enjoy them. Room A-9 apparently especially liked the Sugar Beats' rendition of "Put A Little Love in Your Heart."
92
When an elementary school teacher helps her class to download information about the animals that inhabit the tundra, we all agree that that's admirable. When she teaches the class to download "Put a Little Love in Your Heart," at least some of us would argue that that's reprehensible. Collecting information on the Internet is "learning." Posting information on the net is "sharing." Try exactly the same thing with recorded music and it's "stealing." When my son's teacher downloads information from the Internet and shares it with her students, that's the sort of thing the law is supposed to encourage; when she downloads music from the Internet and shares it with her students, that's the sort of thing the law is supposed to prevent. The law treats the two acts differently because facts are in the public domain, while music is someone's property. Information cannot be owned, we're told, because, unlike music, facts aren't original. 93 From my son's teacher's point of view, though, what she's doing is the same: she's sharing. 94 From her point of view, there's no reason to think that it would make intuitive sense that downloading information to share with her students would be good, while downloading music to share with her students would be bad. Those of us who teach copyright know that the distinction between unprotected fact and protected expression is as elusive and counterintuitive as anything in the copyright course. 95 There's a wealth of literature challenging the rule that information is unlike music in any way that's important to whether we should give it intellectual property 93. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) ("facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship").
94. I probably need to stop here and defend my use of the term "sharing" since it's recently come under attack. Some people argue that whatever using peer-to-peer networking involves, it shouldn't be called "sharing. The word "file-sharing" is a euphemism and a serious misnomer. . . . In fact, it's not really sharing at all, because if I share a piece of cake with you, we're each doing with a little less-I have half a piece and you have half a piece. This doesn't hold true for digital distribution since I don't lose anything by "sharing" with you. . . David Kendall, Copyright in Cyberspace, (March 25, 2002) (Brigance lecture to Wabash College) available at http://www.copyrightassembly.org/briefing/DEKWabash Speech4.htm. Kendall is talking about sharing cake or cookies. That's the wrong metaphor. Sharing digital objects is less like sharing cookies and more like sharing ideas -when I share my ideas, I don't lose anything. Of course, it's precisely the difference between cookies and ideas that causes us to treat the first as tangible property and the second as intellectual property. Cookies have to be allocated. Ideas need not. Indeed, the purpose of the intellectual property regime is to achieve widespread sharing by temporarily endowing IP with some -and only some-of the attributes of tangible property. If we can achieve widespread sharing without endowing IP with those attributes, then we ought at least to question whether the attributes of tangible property are the tools we need.
95. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, COPYRIGHT AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DISTINCTION (2002) (manuscript on file with author).
protection. 96 Any originality-based distinction between facts and notes is untenable, we're told, since unearthing and assembling facts takes at least as much creativity and often lots more money than writing a song. 97 Scholar after scholar has deconstructed the supposed rationales for giving factual information different treatment from fiction, and concluded that the asserted differences can't be defended. The inescapable conclusion, they've told us, is that we need to give comparable intellectual property protection to information. 98 There's a perennial bill pending in the U.S. Congress that threatens to do just that; 99 it's even passed the House of Representatives once or twice. 100 Copyright scholars never seem to reverse the syllogism. You never run into an argument that says: if facts and music are equivalent in the respects that matter, and we have an ample, readily accessible and diverse supply of facts when the law gives them no protection, shouldn't we at least investigate what sort of musical smorgasbord we might develop if we treated music comparably?
IV. Resetting the Default Rules
Who are the Sugar Beats? 101 We have a mature information market on the Internet that allows almost anyone with a net connection to find the answer to almost any question by consulting what would a generation ago have been an unimaginable wealth of information resources. This information space has sprung up not despite but because of the absence of any copyright protection for facts. (If you doubt me, stop a moment for a thought experiment, and imagine what this information space would look like if we adopted and enforced a legal rule that no fact could be posted without the permission of the originator of that fact or his employer or assignee.) At worst, this information space is an invaluable adjunct to the library of reference books, and at best it's a superior alternative for retrieving and disseminating information. If consumer-to-consumer dissemination can create a superior information marketplace, shouldn't we give serious consideration to the idea that it would create a superior music marketplace? The digital information space is compelling at least as much because of the variety and ecology of shared information as because of the convenience and speed that might be supplied by an online "encyclopedia world," containing the digitized text of the Encyclopedia Britannica and a dozen of its competitors. Consumer-to-consumer dissemination of music might enable the evolution of a music space with comparable variety. That potential is more exciting than the advantages of instant gratification that accompany the ability to download whatever music the record labels are currently selling. Just as we wouldn't want to get all of our facts from some giant Encyclopedia Britannica in the sky, there's no need to cabin our musical tastes to reflect what's currently selling in online or offline stores.
How old is the recording industry?
102 At this point, the vast majority of the copyright specialists who stuck with me through part III have stopped reading. They've decided that this is just another rant by one of those copyright-hating academics. 103 There's no rush to reassure them that I'm not seriously suggesting anything so radical as treating music exactly the way we treat facts, or dumping all recorded music into the public domain. They are no longer paying attention. We 102. Early phonographs were marketed as dictation machines. Imagine a world in which consumers were free to copy and transmit any and all recorded musical they wished to. Someone who wants to avoid shelling out $18.98 plus tax for Norah Jones's Feels Like Home 104 could download it from the hard drive of a price-insensitive fan who lives down the block. Someone searching for a track from the 1960s that she hasn't heard in 40 years could find it in the collection of another music lover half way around the world. If one considers only the universe of existing recordings, the promise of copyright-free consumer-to-consumer distribution of music seems boundless. If one were able to prevent -or at least prohibit -spoofing and other well-poisoning, 105 we would have a highly efficient, cheap distribution network. The potential range of the marketplace, including music too marginal to market, too obscure to clear, too unusual to fit into conventional marketing niches, would allow us to find music to scratch almost any itch in our minds' ears as easily as we have become able to satisfy both idle and abiding curiosity with a few clicks of a mouse. Moreover, our experience with nascent peer-to-peer file sharing thus far suggests a strong likelihood that a variety of mechanisms would arise for sorting music and directing the attention of people likely to want it to the appropriate files, and that those mechanisms would prove at least as effective as the current marketing devices. 106 The story for music not-yet-written or not-yet-recorded is more complex. Reasonable people differ vehemently about whether composers would compose songs or performers perform or record them absent the incentives supplied by the current copyright system. 107 We have little empirical data to test theories seeking to explain why musicians make music.
108
Some people have suggested that, at least in some genres, musicians are motivated less by the fact that music is what they love and do best and more by the possibility of hitting it big as the next mega hit rock star. Others argue that the most important role in supplying music to a music-loving public is finding the good stuff. The hard, expensive, crucial task that all the recording industry's bookkeeping tricks are barely managing to subsidize is searching for and identifying the musicians whose work will prove to be worth listening to. These are both completely plausible stories; we don't yet have the tools to allow us to evaluate whether they're more true than not.
Perhaps treating recorded music as if it were in the public domain would usher in an era of enhanced creativity and boundless profit; perhaps songwriters and musicians would choose to become lawyers and investment bankers. We don't have the tools to make a confident prediction. Fortunately, we don't need so extreme a prescription in order to capture the benefits of consumer-to-consumer digital distribution. There's no need to jettison copyright protection for music if, instead, we can apply some of the insight that we've gained from watching the expanding exchange of information over the Internet. Creation and dissemination may flourish without the incentives supposedly supplied by producer control.
109
Even if we believe that copyright-like incentives are sometimes essential to most new stuff will be the product of well-meaning amateurs . . ."), available at http://www.pcworld.com/howto/article/0,aid,111657,00.asp; Mike Stoller, Songs That Won't Be Written, N.Y. TIMES, October 7, 2000, at A15 ("by taking the incentive out of songwriting, Napster may be pushing itself closer to a time when there won't be any songs for its users to swap"), encourage composers and musicians to create music, 110 it doesn't follow that those precise incentives are necessary to induce dissemination.
When will the song "Happy Birthday to You" enter the public domain?
111
Can we design a system that preserves copyright incentives for creators who rely on them while reducing unnecessary barriers hampering wide consumer-to-consumer dissemination? Our experience with digital information works suggests that we can. The flourishing information space on the Internet includes proprietary content sitting alongside material that is freely shared. Because facts are in the public domain, but the prose used to communicate those facts is fully protected by copyright, proprietors of factheavy works have sued, successfully, when their prose is appropriated.
112
Those successful lawsuits don't seem to have impeded the free flow of information significantly. The information ecology continues to function when some information sources prohibit free exchange of their material, not because sharers are scrupulous about sharing only facts and not prose (which they surely are not), but because the proprietors of information-rich content who insist on controlling the dissemination of their stuff mark their content and enclose it in electronic envelopes that give notice of their claims and make it clear that they have opted out of the prevailing norm of sharing. By and large, people appear to respect that choice. The coexistence of proprietary and shared information suggests that we can design a workable shared music space without taking the drastic step of dumping music into the public domain. Another of the lessons we can take from the vibrant commerce in facts that goes on over the Internet is that allowing, indeed encouraging individuals to share music, trade musicengage in non-commercial "stealing" of music if you prefer -without legal liability is not necessarily going to bring the progress of science and the 110. The degree to which U.S. copyright law has sought to motivate creators rather than distributors is open to question. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 75: I have spoken of encouraging "creation" as well as "dissemination," but copyright has evidently more to do today with mobilizing the profit-propelled apparatus of dissemination -publication and distribution -than with calling the signals into first unpublished existence; the latter process must be to a considerable extent selfgenerated. 111. That's hard to tell. Some people insist that it is in the public domain already. See useful arts to a crashing halt, and it has lots of advantages over the distribution system that preceded it.
113
What's the name of that song that keeps going through my head? 114 There are vast differences between music and information, but outside of the fact that the owners of music and sound recording copyrights have a lot more brute political clout than, say, Reed Elsevier, I'm not sure that any of those differences undercut the basic insight: If music in a digital world shares many of the attributes of information, it may be useful to apply some of the wisdom IP law has developed over the protection and distribution of information.
In particular, we should remember that widespread dissemination is as central to the goals of copyright as initial creation; facilitating the sale of copies is only the means the law has adopted to further those goals.
115
If sharing is a more effective method of dissemination than selling copies, then prohibiting sharing to protect the market for copy sales is exactly backward.
116
If we can agree on that, I think it's relatively easy to work out the details of a compromise we can live with. See also, e.g., Musicnotes.com at http://www.musicnotes.com (a licensed commercial sheet music sales site with a lyrics search engine) .
115. If musicians create music primarily because of the control-based incentives supplied by copyright law, one might argue that any encouragement of sharing will reduce the incentives that inspire musicians to produce music. Whether musicians will make music if the copyright regime is altered is an empirical question, but the fact that so many musicians have complained so bitterly at their treatment at the hands of record companies without withholding their music suggests that musicians' motivations are more complex than the simple copyright-incentive model captures. See Ku, supra note 109, at 300-11. In addition, history indicates that the absence of enforceable proprietary rights in music has not dissuaded musicians from creating and performing new works. 116. See Ku, supra note 109, at 305 (on the Internet, "copyright serves no purpose other than to transfer wealth from the public and, as we shall see, artists to distributors. In this case, the use of Napster is not theft-copyright is theft.") 117. I'd probably be comfortable if we found ourselves in a world in which noncommercial consumer-to-consumer file sharing was not illegal. Period. No quid pro quo. I'm confident that we'd figure out ways to ensure that creators of music and the businesses that market them earn emerged that P2P is exciting technology with one serious flaw -creators aren't getting paid.
118
(That flaw characterizes much conventional distribution as well.
119 ) The current conventional system of music distribution has been successful in disseminating a broad range of music to consumers and less successful in compensating the individuals who create that music. Peer-to-peer file trading has so far proved to be a far more effective distribution mechanism for a broader range of music, but is even worse than the conventional system at compensating creators.
120 Tweaking peer-to-peer file trading to incorporate a mechanism for compensating creators is a sensible response to that problem, and there are a host of recent thoughtful suggestions outlining ways to do that. 121 If the only reason we care about compensation for composers and musicians is to induce them to make music, the most efficient option is probably to legalize peer-to-peer file trading, prohibit well-poisoning 122 122. Some copyright owners have fought back against peer-to-peer file trading by "spoofing", see supra note 105, and launching denial-of-service attacks against individuals perceived to be particularly active file traders. Their cumulative efforts have apparently succeeded in significantly reducing the reliability of peer-to-peer file trading. The Recording Industry Association sought legislation that would have immunized copyright owners from suit or criminal prosecution for damage caused by "disabling, interfering with, blocking, diverting, or creator compensation untouched -the recording industry has demonstrated that artists make music even when money is not forthcoming. If our sense of fairness impels us to compensate creators because they deserve to be paid, then extracting creator compensation from peer-to-peer file trading would probably be an easier route than reforming the recording and broadcast industries.
Consumer-to-consumer distribution, after all, is a lot less costly than conventional commercial distribution, and may allow us to free up resources now spent on CD stamping, shipping, storage, shelf space and radio payola, not to mention the huge cost of legal efforts to eradicate what is commonly called "piracy." That money could be used to pay the people who create the music -something the record companies insist they can't really afford to do very well under the current system.
123
A number of scholars have floated proposals urging the adoption of systems that would permit peer-to-peer file sharing, charge money to the people who enjoy it (or the businesses that profit from it), and use those funds to compensate creators and copyright owners. 124 Professor Neil Netanel suggests allowing consumers to engage in unrestricted noncommercial use, adaptation, and peer-to-peer exchange of all types of communicative expression, and imposing a noncommercial use levy to compensate copyright owners. Netanel would impose the levy on the sale of products and services whose value is enhanced by peer-to-peer file sharing. Organizations representing copyright owners would divide the levy proceeds among their members using both sampling and digital tracking technologies.
125
Professor Terry Fisher proposes a slightly otherwise impairing the unauthorized distribution, display, performance, or reproduction of his or her copyrighted work on a publicly accessible peer-to-peer file trading network. Professor Raymond Ku argues that the current copyright law makes no sense in the context of digital distribution. Ku would retain the current law for analog distribution, but would replace copyright in the Internet context with a privilege allowing consumers to engage in noncommercial online distribution. If the revenue from analog sources proved insufficient to support the creation and distribution of music, Ku recommends the enactment of a statute imposing levies on sales of Internet service and on computer, audio, and video equipment. 127 Professor Glynn Lunny argues that private digital copying probably does more good than harm, but suggests that if that harm must be redressed, a levy imposed on devices and blank storage media is the best available solution.
128
Professor Daniel Gervais, analyzing the problem from the Canadian vantage point, where a court has recently concluded that peer-to-peer file sharing is often lawful, 129 suggests modifying existing collective licensing to extend to peer-to-peer file trading. 130 Professor Larry Lessig has weighed in with a modified version of Fisher's proposal, designed to compensate copyright owners temporarily until ubiquitous licensed music streaming replaces peer-to-peer file sharing as consumers' preferred means of gaining access to music. 131. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 300-04.
solution would be for the music industry simply to agree to offer music fans a license to engage in file sharing for a small monthly fee.
132
The music industry's response to all of these proposals 133 has been chilly. Despite a spirited recent defense of the recording industry's need to rely on the copyright compulsory license crafted for its benefit, 134 a recording industry spokesman explained that any compulsory license benefiting the public would be unacceptable because it would involve the government in setting the price for music. 135 Voluntary collective licensing, he insisted, would either be unfair because the few consumers who participated would subsidize the many who continued to rely on free downloads, or it would be voluntary only in name. 133. The differences between these proposals are not, in fact, that large. Netanel's plan would permit unrestricted noncommercial use of most copyrighted material, see Netanel, supra note 121, at 37-43, while Fisher limits his proposal to audio and video recordings, but would allow commercial as well as noncommercial uses. See Fisher, supra note 121, at 203-05, 234-36. Lessig believes that P2P will become less desirable once enhanced Internet access makes ubiquitous licensed streaming an attractive alternative, and would therefore make the system a temporary stopgap. See LESSIG, supra note 51 at 297-303. Netanel, Fisher, Gervais and Lessig would direct their alternative compensation to copyright owners, while Ku would reserve it for musicians and songwriters. Netanel, Fisher and Ku all, however, rely on a government-imposed, Copyright Office-administered fee on the sale of digital goods and services to provide compensation for missed sales and royalties. Netanel would leave the current copyright law untouched except for his noncommercial user privilege and levy. See Netanel, supra note 121, at 37-59. Ku would retain the current law for analog distribution so long as works were distributed in the analog as well as the digital channel. Ku, supra note 109, at 321-24. Fisher envisions his system's ultimately superseding the current statutory copyright. Fisher, supra note 121, at 9-10, 246-51. Despite these differences, however, the core of all of the proposals is to permit, indeed encourage, consumers to engage in consumer-to-consumer distribution while compensating creators from a fund financed by the sales of related equipment and services. Gervais and the Electronic Frontier Foundation rely on similar mechanisms but argue that rights holders should adopt the mechanisms voluntarily and administer them collectively rather than relying on government-administered licensing. As a practical matter, the adoption of any compulsory license would require the endorsement of music and recording industry copyright owners. The differences between the compulsory license proposals and the voluntary collective license proposals are, thus, more formal than fundamental.
134. recording industry, which has recently licensed services that permit consumers to buy the opportunity to listen to or download music recorded in copy-protected digital files, claims that if peer-to-peer file sharing services would simply prevent any exchange of unlicensed content, copyright owners would have an opportunity to sell consumers the music they want. 137 The market can work only if the recording industry doesn't have to compete with free.
At its best, though, letting the market work promises to perpetuate and extend the already vexing problems that have engendered today's music environment, in which rights are difficult or impossible to clear and the majority of creators go unpaid. Nothing in the music and recording industry's promises suggests that they have an interest in solving these problems, much less a plan to do so. Instead, the recording and music industry seem determined to exacerbate the difficulties imposed by a multiplicity of conflicting rights holders, by imposing obligations on hardware manufacturers, software publishers and Internet access services to implement a variety of maddening digital rights management formats and incompatible files and devices. 138 Surely we can do better. Adopting solutions designed to support the current music market structure, and export its anomalies to a digital marketplace, saddles us with undesirable and unnecessary artifacts that arose from problems particular to conventional distribution. Under our current system, immensely talented and hard working composers and musicians, who create great stuff that people would want to buy if they knew about it, are often unable to make a living making music, because the system we rely on to encourage the creation and dissemination of music works best when its products are scarce. As a necessary corollary of a distribution mechanism that requires significant investment of capital in order to deliver music to consumers, that fact may be a regrettable but a reasonable sacrifice at the altar of great music. Extending the lottery-like nature of today's conventional music market to a digital world, though, where maintaining scarcity is more expensive than tolerating ubiquity, is profoundly dysfunctional.
From the viewpoint of the individuals who make the music, moreover, the reform proposals to legitimize peer-to-peer file sharing rely on mechanisms that are remarkably similar to the devices we rely on today to pay money to composers and musicians. 139 In Canada, Europe and Japan, musicians and composers rely heavily on collecting societies. 140 In the United States, a patchwork combination of compulsory licenses, 141 blanket licenses, 142 standard trade practices 143 and rate courts 144 add up to much the same thing. The proposals to enact a new license to permit peer-to-peer file sharing and compensate creators through a levy, tax, or uniform royalty have inspired heated philosophical and economic debates over the flaws in any compulsory or collective licensing system. 145 The objections tend to 139 . Considered in the context of music, the changes envisioned by proponents of blanket licensing for peer-to-peer file sharing are hardly extreme. Consumers already have a privilege to make non-commercial digital copies of musical recordings, and the right to distribute those copies to members of the public. See 17 U.S.C. § § 1008, 109 (2000). The scope of the copying privilege is contested. The statute prohibits copyright infringement actions "based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings." Id. Digital musical recordings are defined to exclude material objects "in which one or more computer programs are fixed." Id. § 1001. That has led some to argue and at least one court to conclude that section 1008 shields non-commercial recordings burned to music CDs (on which a royalty has been paid), or recorded on analog or digital audiotape, but excludes recordings saved to a computer hard disk. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. ignore the fact that to the extent that composers and performers currently earn income from the sale and performance of recorded music, they collect most of that income through a combination of standardized, compulsory and collective licenses administered by intermediaries (music publishers, record companies, performing rights societies) in return for payment. From the vantage point of music creators, replacing the theoretical control they enjoy under the copyright law with an enforceable promise of payment makes them no worse off, and makes most of them better off.
The intermediaries who hold control over musical works and recordings are also in it for the money, and one might expect them to be delighted to hand over their control in return for more cash. Not a bit of it. 146 The current dominant forces in the music and recording business may no longer need record pressing plants, CD stamping plants, warehouses and trucks to distribute music, but they have a huge stake in ensuring that digital distributors be limited to those who used to rely on record pressing plants, CD stamping plants, warehouses and trucks. The rest of us, however, don't share that stake. Indeed, new distributors who never assumed those expenses may be in a position to experiment with new variations on digital distribution and still pay a larger percentage of proceeds to the creators of the material.
The proposals advanced by Netanel, Fisher, Ku, Lunney, Gervais and Lessig would improve the law by allowing frictionless, consumer-toconsumer dissemination, and collecting royalties to compensate creators from those who in a broad sense may be described as commercially exploiting copyrighted works. 147 Moreover, when their schemes are limited to music, currently the most vexing case of consumer-to-consumer dissemination, the proposals are modest extensions of devices contained in current law and business practice. In drawing on their analyses, I end up suggesting a variant solution pegged at least initially only to music sharing, but my pursuit of some different choices shouldn't obscure the importance of their work. The politics of copyright legislation will likely prevent us from adopting any of the proposals they advance, but our copyright law would be much improved if we did. 
V. Sharing and Hoarding
How violent is next week's episode of Dragonball Z?
148
If I'm persuaded that politics would prevent the adoption of the sort of peer-to-peer licensing solutions scholars have proposed, why am I bothering to articulate my own variation? 149 As consensus builds around the idea of paid peer-to-peer, it seems increasingly plausible that some legislation will emerge with enough support from the music, recording, computer, and consumer electronic industries to have a fair chance of enactment. I expect that that legislation will include both consumer downloads of music and collective licenses to pay for them. Such a bill is less likely to resemble the proposals advanced by Netanel, Fisher, Lunney, Ku, Gervais, or Lessig, however, than it is to be designed to maintain the current recording and music industry distributors in their market dominant position. Most importantly, it is less likely to incorporate a privilege for consumer-to-consumer dissemination than it is to include measures designed to prevent it. If we are willing to give up consumer-to-consumer dissemination in return for the instant gratification of licensed direct downloads, the recording industry is probably willing to sell us copyprotected files replicating much of the music it makes available in stores.
The prospect of downloading copy-protected versions of music otherwise available in stores is not particularly enticing. This is the music version of the online "Encyclopedia World," and we can do better. The promise of being able to find music that is not available in stores, and to share it with other consumers, in contrast, is compelling. Lots of music is 148. See Molikidan Tunksuu, Dragonball Z a Titles and AirDates Guide, at http://epguides.com/DragonballZ/. Dragonball Z is a violent and modestly homoerotic product of Japanese animation derived from a manga (comic book) authored by Akira Toriyama. The original manga and animated series appear to have been intended for an audience of grownups, but Funimation has edited them to make them more nearly suitable for children and licensed them to the Cartoon Network. 40-48 (1995) . If that proposal were adopted, consumers would be free to engage in peer-to-peer file sharing, while commercial peer-to-peer file sharing software and services would face liability. That result seems to accord with many people's instincts about what makes sense. I don't mean by offering this reform plan to repudiate that proposal, which I continue to support. See Litman, supra note 1, at 180-85. not available in any store, because it's old, it's obscure, it has little commercial potential, or the rights can't be cleared without a statutory license or privilege because it's just too difficult to figure out who owns them. Consumer-to-consumer music dissemination makes it possible to find and share that music.
The fact that more than sixty million consumers are currently exchanging music over peer-to-peer networks in the U.S. gives them a stake in the building consensus, and a political claim to a seat at the copyright bargaining table as well as a moral one. The details of any proposal for an online music system will determine the extent to which it promotes unfettered consumer-to-consumer exchange, allows untethered consumer use, encourages the broad dissemination of a wide variety of music of disparate types, takes advantage of the economies made possible by digital distribution, and pays composers and musicians. The details of such a system will also determine whether and to what extent it requires copyright police to enforce its rules. The more conversations that people who are not copyright lobbyists can have about the details of a revised copyright bargain, the better positioned they will be to shape the law Congress may enact. 150 The devil will be in the details, and focusing on the details allows us to figure out which ones are most important.
I suggest that we should try to build a music space that resembles the current digital information space in the ubiquity of music it contains and the ease with which music may be shared, and that we should devise a combination of blanket fees or levies designed to compensate the creators of the music we exchange. In order to achieve the breadth and diversity of music (and the community of consumers who enjoy it) that has evolved in the Internet information space, we will need to rely on consumer-toconsumer dissemination as well as licensed downloads or streams. If we as consumers want to pay for the music we exchange, we need some form of blanket fee or levy to enable us to do so. Because some creators and copyright owners find the idea of consumer-to-consumer dissemination unacceptable, I suggest that we devise a way to allow them to withhold their music from the system. To discourage them from electing that option, I believe we should optimize the legal infrastructure for sharing. I've drawn the details of that infrastructure with an eye toward recapturing some of the lost advantages of notice and indivisibility. 
So, should I have a drink with that guy or not?
151 One important goal of online music copyright reform, I would argue, should be to encourage music file sharing, as distinguished from merely tolerating it. To do that, it should incorporate some licensing mechanism that can cut through the thicket of overlapping and conflicting rights. In addition, the legal defaults of such a system need to be reset to "share" rather than "hoard." So long as shareable is the legal default, we don't need to make sharing compulsory. We can allow creators who would like to prevent their music from being shared to make that election, without encouraging them to do so. The system should allow consumers, computers and software to ascertain, easily, whether music is hoarded or shareable, and thus encourage the design of computer software allowing the sharing of shareable music while making it difficult to share hoarded music. Another equally important goal is to generate and actually distribute payments to the creators of music. Moreover, music copyright reform should be cast so as to avoid unnecessarily entrenching the intermediaries who dominate the current bricks-and-mortar distribution system, and should provide opportunities for the generation of new digital intermediaries who can explore different ways of adding value to music and promoting it to its audience. Finally, a reform proposal should in the best of worlds accomplish all of this without abrogating any international copyright treaties.
With those goals to guide us, we can envision a legal architecture that would encourage but not compel copyright owners to make their works available for widespread sharing over digital networks. Although a variety of different licensing mechanisms would be suitable, I favor a blanket license that would be both statutory and voluntary. By statutory, I mean that the copyright law would prescribe the terms and conditions of the license. By voluntary, I mean that the law would provide an opportunity to designate works as ineligible for the blanket license. Critics of compulsory license proposals have complained about government involvement in music price regulation, and suggested that collective licensing using a copyright owner member organization, rather than the government, to collect and disburse royalties would be a superior alternative. 152 Our experience of collective licensing, however, indicates that royalty collectives may sometimes be better at collecting money than disbursing it. A government agency that requires transparency from designated licensing agents and that can serve as the collection and disbursement agent of last resort for creators who designate no agent to represent them seems likely to encourage prospective licensing agents to compete in the representation they offer, and may diminish the possibility that any funds will be consumed by administrative and legal expenses before they can be allocated to claimants. 153 We should build the statutory license around a payment mechanism designed to compensate creators and to bypass unnecessary intermediaries.
154
That mechanism should have sufficient flexibility to allow current and new upstart intermediaries to devise useful value-added flavors of intermediation and collect dollars accordingly. The most straightforward route to accomplish that would be to assign the right to collect the proceeds of the license directly to the individual creators of music rather than their intermediaries, but without relieving them of any contractual obligations they may have assumed to pass some portion of their receipts to others. Where extant contracts speak directly to the division of royalties for consumer-to-consumer digital dissemination, the contracts will doubtless control. Where contracts are unclear or lost, the creators and their intermediaries will need to work things out. Creators who don't wish to act as their own collection agents should be encouraged to designate agents to collect and disburse funds on their behalves. Where a composer or performer prefers to eschew representation, however, she should be able to collect her share of any fund from the government entity that will collect and disburse the money.
153. The current debates over proposals for alternative compensation systems have tended to devolve into religious disagreements over whether dividing the money up among claimants requires counting every download, as Fisher's system would, or relying on a less precise measure in order to preserve the privacy of downloaders, as Gervais and others suggest. Counting every download poses problems other than privacy. It makes little sense to require a measuring system that is so expensive that it consumes the bulk of the proceeds. As an initial matter, the law should instruct the government entity charged with disbursing the funds in very general terms, to ensure the money is distributed fairly among creators. Fine tuning, if it proves necessary, can come later.
154. Here I part company from both Netanel and Fisher, who insist that compensation under their proposed alternatives should flow to the copyright owners rather than to the creators of works. Netanel suggests that, under his system, empowered creators will no longer need to rely on intermediaries and will increasingly retain copyright ownership. See Netanel, supra note 121, at 58-59. I'm skeptical.
In the first instance, money should be disbursed to the musicians and composers who author music and recordings. 155 If musicians and composers have assigned their copyrights to intermediaries, they would be obliged to pass along their assignees' share of that money under whatever terms their contracts set.
156
There is value nonetheless in choosing to distribute the money directly to the creators. First, where contracts do not assign the copyright in its entirety and fail to speak to the rights to collect royalties for consumer-to-consumer digital dissemination, the question whether particular intermediaries have contractual rights to a portion of the fees will depend on the language of the particular contracts. If intermediaries are optional contributors to digital dissemination, it seems counterproductive to presume that they must have persuaded creative contributors to assign them any rights that would ever become remunerative. Where particular contracts don't seem to say, or simply cannot be found, the creators of the music ought to be able to keep the payments, or to find different intermediaries who may be able to administer digital rights without the inertia of bookkeeping tricks that became customary fifty or more years ago.
157 Second, directing the payments to authors and performers addresses a problem that has plagued the administration of extant compulsory licenses in the United States. The system for managing those licenses was designed by large, well-financed and legally sophisticated stakeholders, with large, well-financed and legally sophisticated stakeholders in mind, and has systematically disadvantaged stakeholders who are small, independent or poorly organized. The price of a ticket to a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel proceeding is beyond the means of all but the wealthiest interest groups. 158 Why not design the system so that individuals can actually use it? Finally, directing the payments to composers and musicians will pose an opportunity for new flavors of intermediary interested in providing a different package of services in return for a different percentage of receipts. Those 155. As well as encouraging creators to designate agents to collect on their behalves, we should permit them to designate percentages of any proceeds that should be disbursed directly to intermediaries under whatever contracts might call for a royalty split.
156. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1) (2000) (providing that recording artists are entitled to receive payments from copyright owners for licensed webcasts in accordance with the terms of their recording contracts).
157. intermediaries may introduce new value-added enhancements to digital distribution.
There are two extant models for collecting the fees to be divided among creators: the first model is a direct blanket license fee of the sort collected by performing rights organizations such as ASCAP. Subscribers wishing to engage in peer-to-peer file sharing would pay a premium that would absolve them from liability for infringement. The Electronic Frontier Foundation proposal for voluntary collective licensing endorses this model. 159 The second model is to impose a levy or tax on the sale of goods or services that are most directly involved in peer-to-peer file trading. Professors Netanel and Fisher, among others, base their proposals on this model. 160 The United States copyright statute includes examples following both models, 161 as do the copyright laws of our trading partners. 162 The levy or tax approach has the dual advantages of fairness 163 and relative ease of administration -it can be imposed on commercial activities that earn money from peer-to-peer file sharing without inflicting significant burdens on consumers. That strength may be its most important disadvantage: to the extent that license fees "feel free" to consumers they may conclude that paying creators for music is unnecessary or unimportant. Whichever model we adopt, though, we need to remember that the consumers who are engaging in this behavior are providing the valuable services that in the bricks-and-mortar world are provided by CD stamping plants, warehouses, trucks, record stores, and radio broadcasters, and they should be compensated accordingly. 164 The fees consumers pay to engage in file trading don't need to replace the income of the intermediaries they're replacing, and I think those fees shouldn't be large.
If the legal architecture encourages sharing but permits what we might want to call "hoarding," then consumer-to-consumer exchange can develop without difficult legal or technological barriers. 165 Thus, I'd be willing to incorporate a limited, carefully structured, notice-based opt out for copyright owners who prefer control to payment. If hoarded music is indeed superior, it will be able to compete with the "free" stuff. (If it can't compete with the "free" stuff, then overall welfare is probably enhanced if we refuse to subsidize it with expensive legal barriers and copyright police.) To achieve a legal regime that encourages sharing but permits hoarding, we should impose a requirement that copyright owners who decide to hoard must forgo any payment for hoarded works from the common payment system, and must take affirmative but relatively modest steps to exclude their works from the network and enable consumers to quickly and painlessly ascertain that those works may not lawfully be shared.
My reasons for preferring a system that copyright owners can choose not to participate in are at least in part pragmatic. First, so long as the legal and technological architecture are optimized for sharing, allowing copyright owners to withhold their works does little harm. Paid subscription information and news sites on the Internet coexist comfortably with sites that are open to the public and free of charge; if we can duplicate that peaceful coexistence for digital music, it seems sensible to try to do so. Second, if we design an alternative compensation system to collect enough money to compensate the proprietors of mega-hits for all of their forgone income, we can expect that the expense of such a system will be unreasonably high, and that the compensation paid to the creators of more modestly successful music will be unreasonably low. Third, if such a system allows copyright owners to decline to participate, it seems more likely that it will be deemed at least arguably compliant with our treaty obligations under the Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 166 Finally, my proposal is motivated in part by my conviction that composers and musicians have been ill-served by the current system. If they 165 . I believe that in general outline, this solution is appropriate for copyrighted works other than music. Cf. Litman, supra note 1, at 180-86 (outlining alternative to current copyright law). I focus on music here because the differences between my proposal and current law are narrowest in the music context, and because the peer-to-peer file sharing of music recordings is perceived to be the current emergency facing copyright legislators.
166. Although desirable, the proposal's Berne-compatibility is optional. We could comply with our treaty obligations by limiting the application of any provision to "United States works" as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. United States works include all works first published in the U.S. nonetheless prefer the dysfunction they know to a new and unproved system, and we can make the system work without including them, I see no important policies that will be served by forcing them to participate. At the same time, it makes little sense to allow copyright owners to opt out too easily. A key element of my proposal relies on consumer willingness to pay a blanket license fee to share some but not all music. I believe that consumers will be willing to pay a blanket license fee if it seems clear that they are buying something of appropriate value. The value of the system would diminish significantly if the list of unshareable music were so long it became burdensome to check it.
To enable an opt-out mechanism that won't deform the legal and technical architecture encouraging sharing, I suggest that we try to reproduce the functions that notice and indivisibility provided before we abandoned them. 167 Consumers should be able to rely on an assumption that musical works may be shared unless copies of the works indicate otherwise in some fashion that can be read by both consumers and their computers. The key to the opt-out mechanism I propose is the selection of a single digital file format or family of formats capable of conveying copyright management information as defined in section 1202 of the copyright act. 168 The format will probably incorporate digital rights "copyright management information" means any of the following information conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a work, including in digital form, except that such term does not include any personally identifying information about a user of a work or of a copy, phonorecord, performance, or display of a work:
(1) The title and other information identifying the work, including the information set forth on a notice of copyright.
(2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the author of a work.
(3) The name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of copyright. (4) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations, the name of, and other identifying information about, a performer whose performance is fixed in a work other than an audiovisual work. (5) With the exception of public performances of works by radio and television broadcast stations, in the case of an audiovisual work, the name of, and other management capability because the people who will be using it will desire that feature, but there's no need for any copy-protection to be hack-proof, or even exceptionally durable. To the extent feasible, the new format should be compatible with the current generation of digital playback devices. 169 I'll call the format "*.drm" for short. 170 Any musical work or sound recording that is made available to the public, under the copyright owner's authority, only in *.drm format will be ineligible for sharing or compensation. 171 At such time as the creators or copyright owners of a work desire to participate in the revenue earned from digital sharing, they may publish the work in other formats and become eligible to collect compensation.
What about the works being traded on peer-to-peer networks today? The system can incorporate an opportunity to withdraw works from sharing, but in fairness to consumers, the process for withdrawing a work should be significantly more difficult than the initial choice to withhold it.
172 (Frankly, I'd prefer it if it were sufficiently onerous to withdraw a work from the shareable realm that it would almost never make economic sense to pursue it. Some works will doubtless be hoarded for noneconomic reasons, 173 but we shouldn't encourage it.) Moreover, discouraging consumers from trading hoarded music requires that they identifying information about, a writer, performer, or director who is credited in the audiovisual work. 171. Implementing the proposal would require an amendment to the mechanical compulsory license provisions in 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). As amended, section 115 would need to require any recording of a work issued only in *.drm format to itself be in *.drm format. See Loren, supra note 68.
172. If, as some claim, the recording and music industries are intent on protecting their hot new hits from peer-to-peer networking but are resigned to the traffic in unauthorized copies of older releases, that feature should not be too bitter to swallow.
173. I would, for example, expect composers and performers to want to consider withdrawing works upon terminating copyright transfers under section 203 or 304.
believe the division between shared and hoarded is a reasonable one. If consumers understand that hoarding applies to new works and not the stuff on their hard disks, they're more likely to go along.
For all works that have been released in any format other than *.drm, then, the law should adopt a presumption of shareability. Copyright owners may avail themselves of an opportunity to withdraw works that have already been made available to the public, but the terms of that opportunity should be sufficiently burdensome that they don't lightly undertake to withdraw a work. I'd suggest that withdrawing a work would require the copyright owner to take the following steps: All owners of the copyright in the work, as well as the work's creators, would be required to join in the decision to withdraw. 174 First, the copyright owners would need to recall copies of the work released in formats other than *.drm, 175 and offer any consumers who own authorized, commercial copies in a non-*.drm format the opportunity to swap those copies for *.drm copies at no charge. Second, the law should incorporate a 24-month grace period before any withdrawal of a work could take effect.
176
(In the meantime, withdrawn works could collect payments from the common fund.) Finally, in order to recover in an infringement suit for consumer-to-consumer dissemination of a withdrawn work, the copyright owner would need to show knowledge that the work had been withdrawn.
177
Whatever happened to Herman's Hermits? 178 With the exception of works released only in *.drm format, consumerto-consumer dissemination and any reproduction, distribution or public performance or display that it entailed, would be completely legal. Any music that's already been released in other formats could be recaptured only with great difficulty, so the overwhelming majority of music currently being shared over peer-to-peer networks would not be locked back up. It would, however, be eligible for compensation. Creators of new releases could choose to make them available for sharing or they could hoard them and forgo both the free distribution and the additional income that sharing would generate.
Inevitably, some noncompliant consumer will seek to trade a *.drm file over a peer-to-peer network. Copyright owners could sue, as they do now, for copyright infringement. Notwithstanding that record labels are currently pressing copyright infringement suits against individual peer-topeer file traders, why would they settle for a system that gives them no more effective an enforcement mechanism than the one they have now? My answer is that if hoarding were reserved for new releases with significant commercial potential, I believe that consumers would be far more likely to respect the choice to hoard, and a law with broad consumer support is easier to enforce than one that lacks it. 179 The use of a single file format will enable consumers easily to identify files they may not share and facilitate efforts of software designers to create file sharing software that blocks transfers of proprietary files. The use of a single, identified file format captures some of the public benefits of copyright notice and registration. By allowing copyright owners to opt out of file sharing so long and only so long as their work remains published in the single *.drm format, the proposal mitigates the effects of divisibility by requiring the copyright owners to coordinate with one another in exploiting their works.
My specific proposal is inspired by an impulse to see whether an architecture like the one that has permitted the Internet to flourish as an information space can define a thriving music space. The U.S. recording industry's recent enforcement campaign seems to seek to move us in a very different direction. It promises us something we would all agree is desirable if we only renounce what to many of us is crucial. The recording industry appears poised to accept a world in which we agree to allow consumer downloading (for a price) but not what the recording industry is calling "uploading" -which is the state of having on your hard disk a music file that someone else can search for and copy from you. Just as the idiosyncratic interests of large numbers of individuals who want to share is directly responsible for the wealth and incredible variety of information we can find when we go looking for it, I think that consumer-to-consumer file trading has the potential to make it economically feasible to distribute a much broader variety of music to a much larger audience. I'd hate to lose that potential just because it's strange, new, unproven, and not yet well represented by lobbyists.
